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Abstract—Novel Internet services are emerging around an
increasing number of sensors and actuators in our surroundings,
commonly referred to as smart devices. Smart devices, which
form the backbone of the Internet of Things (IoT), enable
alternative forms of user experience by means of automation,
convenience, and efﬁciency. At the same time new security
and safety issues arise, given the Internet-connectivity and the
interaction possibility of smart devices with human’s proximate
living space. Hence, security is a fundamental requirement of the
IoT design. In order to remain interoperable with the existing
infrastructure, we postulate a security framework compatible
to standard IP-based security solutions, yet optimized to meet
the constraints of the IoT ecosystem. In this ongoing work, we
ﬁrst identify necessary components of an interoperable secure
End-to-End communication while incorporating Public-key Cryp-
tography (PKC). To this end, we tackle involved computational
and communication overheads. The required components on the
hardware side are the affordable hardware acceleration engines
for cryptographic operations and on the software side header
compression and long-lasting secure sessions. In future work, we
focus on integration of these components into a framework and
the evaluation of an early prototype of this framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emerging smart devices in our immediate environment
perform sensing and actuating tasks which enable unique forms
of experience with our surroundings. Given the integrity of
smart devices in our proximate living space, they deal with
sensitive data of our daily lives and can perform malicious
actuating commands with critical safety implications on our
lives. For example, cyber criminals could launch an attack to
turn on heatings of countless households at the same time to
trigger a collapse of the power grid, or misuse smart devices
in form of botnets1. Hence, in order to prevent leakage of
sensitive data and prevention of malicious actuating tasks,
security is vital for the IoT ecosystem. More importantly, since
the end-user can not easily modify smart devices, security must
be already designed into the system. Security in the IoT must
ensure secrecy and integrity of communication, as well as the
authenticity of messages.
Smart devices are inherently resource constrained with
regards to processing power, memory, communication band-
width, and energy. We consider smart devices that are equipped
with only a few MHz of computation power, several KBytes
of RAM and several tens of KBytes of ROM. The main
1”Proofpoint Uncovers Internet of Things (IoT) Cyberattack”, January 16,
2014: http://www.proofpoint.com/about-us/press-releases/01162014.php
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Fig. 1. Main components of a our lightweight PKC-based framework for the
IoT, with the affected sides on constrained devices.
energy sources are typically batteries, energy harvesting, or
a combination of both. Since smart devices should operate
for long times, energy efﬁciency is another important factor
besides computational and memory efﬁciency. Currently, the
integrated hardware support for symmetric-key cryptography
(e.g., AES) provides fast and cheap en/decryption on smart
devices. However, an efﬁcient and scalable key management
scheme, which is required for symmetric-key cryptography,
is still missing. Public-key Cryptography (PKC) is a popular
method for key establishment, but the high computational
overheads are the main boundary for constrained devices.
In this ongoing work, we (i) identify necessary components
of a PKC-based security framework for the IoT, as depicted
in Fig. 1. These components tackle the computational and
communication overheads involved in a PKC-based security
protocol. The integration of these components and the herewith
related challenges are still unexplored. More importantly, the
seamless integration of the hardware acceleration engine into
IP-based security protocols, such as DTLS, makes security
more affordable on constrained devices. Furthermore, we
plan to (ii) perform thorough evaluations of our PKC-based
framework on constrained devices, with a focus on scalability
and efﬁciency, in terms of computation and communication
overheads.
II. FRAMEWORK DESIGN
Given the resource constraints of smart devices, we focus
our work on four different components. The ﬁrst component
deals with reducing the constant header overheads, that are
caused by security protocols. Furthermore, we look at possi-
bilities of reducing the occurrences of the most expensive partof a secure communication, namely the session establishment.
The third component, is the efﬁcient use of certiﬁcates for
secure authentication and key agreement. Finally, potential
usage of hardware acceleration engines for PKC forms the
fourth component. In the following, we elaborate on each of
these components.
Compression. Security protocols come along with large
header sizes. These headers are not designed with the limita-
tions of the constrained devices in mind. For instance, a typical
handshake packet of the DTLS protocol has header lengths of
25 Byte and each data packet is concatenated with a header of
length 13 Byte. In [1], we show how the transmission overhead
of DTLS in constrained networks can be reduced to as few
Bytes as 3 for the handshake and 5 Byte for data packets.
Session Resumption. Protocol handshakes for establishing
a secure session incur transmission overheads of at least several
hundred Bytes. In the IoT paradigm, however, communication
becomes more sparse. Hence, handshakes are more often
required. Session resumption is a feature used in the Internet,
to allow a secure session to last for a longer time. To this
end, the security context is not removed after the session
teardown and can be used for possible subsequent sessions. In
order to mitigate DoS attacks, todays servers ofﬂoad the corre-
sponding security context toward clients. In [2], we introduce
a constrained-device-friendly session resumption method that
allows for ofﬂoading the security context towards the more
powerful end-point.
Certiﬁcates. Certiﬁcates are widely used in the Web. They
bind a public-key to a deﬁned identity. This information is
veriﬁed via the signature of a Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) as
a trusted third party. PKC enables an efﬁcient and scalable
key management, since the end-points do not require to
share a secret prior to communication. More importantly, with
mutual certiﬁcate-based authentication no human interaction
is required during the authentication, which makes certiﬁcates
suitable for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication. The
disadvantages of certiﬁcates with regards to constrained envi-
ronments are their large size and the involved PKC computa-
tions. To tackle the large size of a certiﬁcate, it is important to
ﬁrst of all employ Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), instead
of RSA. This reduces the key size from 3072 to 256 bits
with the same level of security. Furthermore, certiﬁcates can
become arbitrarily large. In order to avoid this, we create a
list of recommendations on creating compact certiﬁcates. For
instance, avoiding unnecessary extensions goes hand-in-hand
with smaller certiﬁcate sizes. Moreover, it is important to keep
the length of certiﬁcate-chains as low as possible. According
to Google’s pilot log traces for Certiﬁcate Transparency2 2.4 %
of logged certiﬁcates are directly signed by a root CA, 67.7 %
by one intermediary CA and 28.8 % by two intermediaries.
For smart devices, it is important to have certiﬁcates which are
directly signed by a root CA, in order to keep the transmission
overhead as low as possible.
Hardware Acceleration Engine. Traditionally, PKC has
been considered not feasible for constrained devices [3]. Exist-
ing ECC libraries for constrained devices require few KBytes
2Certiﬁcate Transparency (RFC 6962), http://www.certiﬁcate-
transparency.org, log trace with 2.8 million entries retrieved at October
17, 2013
of static RAM and in order of 10 KBytes of ROM. Given
that PKC is used only at session establishments, dedicating
memory space during the whole life cycle of a smart device
for PKC means less memory space for applications. Recent
System-on-Chip (SoC)3 developments not only offer hardware
encryption engines for AES and SHA, but as well acceleration
engines for ECC or RSA for a secure key exchange. With an
additional cost of 6 % ( 0.2 $), hardware acceleration engines
would enable efﬁcient PKC on smart devices, making large
PKC libraries dispensable [4], [5].
III. FRAMEWORK INTEGRATION
The introduced components of our framework can be
further optimized in their own domain, however, we are
additionally interested in the integration of these components.
The header compression is transparent to application layer
protocols and is applied to communication within a con-
strained network. Hence, incoming and outgoing messages
are de/compressed at border routers which interconnect a
constrained network with the Internet. The session resumption
feature is, similar to header compression, transparent to the
application layer. This feature, allows the smart device, to
ofﬂoad the encrypted security context of a session to the more
powerful end-point. The hardware acceleration engines require
drivers to provide an interface for the crypto functionality. We
employ the AES interface for the protection of communication.
The ECC interface is used during the handshake phase, namely
the veriﬁcation of certiﬁcates and key agreement. Regarding
the certiﬁcates, the engagement of the developer is required.
The developer should provide certiﬁcates that comply with our
recommendations regarding cipher suites and used ﬁelds. This
allows to have certiﬁcates which are compact in size.
IV. FUTURE WORK
In this work, we deﬁne mechanisms to achieve secure
E2E communication with constrained environments involving
Public-key Cryptography (PKC). To this end, we are consid-
ering an early prototype integrating the four components of
header compression, session resumption, compact certiﬁcates
and hardware acceleration engines for crypto. Moreover, we
aim at gaining insight about efﬁciency, usability, sustainability
of our framework through extensive evaluations. In our eval-
uation, we consider the feasibility, scalability and convenient
of deployments and maintenance.
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